Did colonial policies in India deliver excessive returns to British investors? We answer this question using annual data on Indian securities trading on the London Stock Exchange. We present new series on market capitalization, capital gains, dividend yields, and total returns of railway securities from 1879 to 1929. The average annual total return on the largest and most important Indian railway securities was 3.7%. These returns were not excessive by any financial standard. Indeed, they were lower than the return on railway securities for other regions like North America, Latin America, and Asia. We also undertake an event study analysis to assess if Indian railways significantly benefited British investors. When the Government of India purchased large positions in the private railway companies between 1880 and 1910, there were opportunities for profit-making. However, we find no evidence of abnormal investor returns in the years leading to the purchase of railway companies. Broadly our findings call into question the extractive nature of colonial railway policy.
Beginning in the 1850s, private British companies built the first Indian railways using London capital markets for financing. British residents in India managed the railways with oversight from company boards in London. Importantly, colonial regulations gave private investors a 5 percent guarantee on railway capital invested at a fixed exchange rate. If net earnings as a share of capital fell below 5 percent, the Government of India (GOI) used its own tax revenues to pay the private railway company the difference up to 5 percent. Dividend guarantees are a prime example of an extractive policy. Early railway companies did not earn five percent and Indian taxpayers paid for the guarantees.
Such guarantees payment were large totaling 568 million pounds between 1849 and 1900.
Yet, guarantee payments never exceeded 0.5 percent of national income in a single year (Hurd 1983) . This model of privately owned and operated railways with 5% guarantees was phased-out in favor of state ownership and private operation beginning in the 1880s followed by complete GOI ownership in the 1920s.
We examine the financial returns to investing in Indian and other foreign railway securities using data from the Investors Monthly Manual (IMM). Our analysis builds on a new IMM database digitized by the International Center for Finance at the Yale
School of Management. It has information on all securities trading in the London Stock
Exchange between 1869 and 1929. We first construct the market capitalization of all Indian securities on the London exchange to illustrate the importance of railways over time. Non-rail industries account for 45 percent of Indian issues trading in London, yet railways account for 80 percent of market capitalization in these decades. Dividend guaranteed securities represent 69 percent of Indian railway market capitalization in 1869.
Their share declines after the 1880s as they are replaced by railway corporate bonds and common equity.
Second, we construct unweighted and market capitalization weighted annual returns on the main Indian railway securities-guaranteed securities, corporate bonds and common equity. Our calculations show the unweighted average annual total return on dividend guaranteed securities was only 3.7% between 1880 and 1908. Corporate bonds yield a marginally higher average return at 4.6% up to 1929. Indian railway equities do better earning 7% on average, but they were more volatile with the lowest market capitalization.
India's modest performance stands in sharp contrast to other parts of the world. Using the same IMM database, we construct comparable annual returns to railway bonds in other countries. We focus on bonds because they account for the majority of private railway financing in the world. Capital returns to Indian bonds and guaranteed securities were lower than in Asia or Latin America. Indian bonds also trailed European and North American railway bonds up to the 1910s. Dividend yields to Indian railway bonds and guarantees were among the lowest in the world.
We also calculate the return per unit of risk, namely the average return minus the risk free return divided by the standard deviation. Indian railway bonds yielded lower returns per unit of risk than railway securities in Latin America, North America, and Asia. Indian railway securities performed better only in comparison to UK railway securities.
But, even here the returns per unit of risk were not substantially higher.
What do these figures imply for the debate on colonial extraction? Our takeaway is the returns to Indian railways were not excessive. Of special note, the return per unit of risk on Indian guaranteed securities was low. There is no evidence that guarantee railways offered excessive returns to British investors.
We also undertake an event study of the GOI take over of the private railway companies, which further supports that guarantees did not significantly benefit British investors. All the guaranteed railways were partially or completely nationalized between 1879 and 1907. The takeover procedure followed terms of the original contracts. Investors were paid the average stock price in the 3 years prior to the takeover date. One might expect high investor returns leading up to takeover if institutions were generally extractive. One might also imagine a 'gaming' of stock prices to increase the GOI purchase price.
In our event study, we test for abnormal returns in the three years leading to takeover of the original guaranteed companies. We find no evidence on average of significant cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-year window before takeovers. East Indian, the first British company taken over in 1879, has mild positive cumulative abnormal returns in their 3-month window before takeover, but the next company, Eastern Bengal, has mild negative abnormal returns in their 3-month window before takeover. Apart from them, we find no significant cumulative abnormal returns across railways and event windows.
Our paper contributes to three literatures. First, our results speak to the large literature on institutions dating to the seminal work of North (1990 Second, our paper relates to the literature on the economic effects of Empire in India.
On the positive side such debates highlight the benefits of rule of law, British legal institutions, access to new markets and technology (for example Ferguson 2003 ). On the negative side scholars highlight high taxation, drain of Indian resources, and low public investments (for example Bagchi 1982) . Such arguments, however, give too much agency to colonial rule. India was a fiscally poor colonial state with limited ability to affect large positive or negative change (Roy 2011 ). In contrast, we focus on Indian railway securities where colonial policy set the terms of the contract. They allowed private companies to raise money in London. They used divided guarantees to attract foreign capital. Yet, they could not dictate the financial returns. Indian railway securities were a low risk, low return investment.
Third and finally, we add to the literature on historical UK and overseas equity indices, including papers using the IMM (for example, Grossman 2002 Grossman , 2015 . This literature shows that securities for firms operating outside of Britain yielded higher returns on average than securities for firms operating in Britain (Edelstein 1976 , Grossman 2002 , Goetzmann and Ukhov 2006 . Unlike these broad studies, we focus on Indian railways and compare their securities to global railway securities. We provide new summary patterns on the financial returns to investing in railways across many regions of the world between 1879 and 1929. Our findings show that Indian railways were an exception to the general pattern of high overseas returns in London. Across a range of securities, including bonds and equities, we find the average return on Indian railways was low and relatively stable even though India was one of the least developed economies with securities trading on the London exchange.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on Indian railways. We describe the IMM data in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the returns to Indian securities. Section 5 compares Indian returns on railway securities to other parts of the world. Section 6 conducts an event-study analysis and Section 7 concludes.
Background on Indian Railway Companies
Four phases mark the construction of colonial Indian railways. In the first phase from 1850 to 1869, private British companies constructed and managed trunk lines under a public guarantee. In the second phase, the GOI constructed railways in the 1870s. Beginning in the 1880s, the third phase, new public-private partnerships emerged between the GOI as majority owner and new private British companies. And, in the fourth and final phase, the GOI began a take over of rail operations leading to complete nationalization over time. 5 We summarize key issues below that are most relevant to this study.
Two private British companies, the East Indian and Great Indian Peninsula built the first Indian railways in the 1850s. While the East Indian sought to connect the port of Calcutta in the east to Delhi in the interior, the Great Indian Peninsula worked on railways connecting Bombay in the west to Delhi. Six more British companies followed in the 1850s and 60s. A map of Indian railways is shown in Appendix Figure 1 .
Such early companies were set-up as joint stock companies under the oversight of both the Secretary of State for India in Britain and the GOI. While the GOI retained authority on route placement and gauge, the companies made other construction decisions (Kerr 2007 ). They were also given free land by the GOI and received dividend guarantees. The GOI guaranteed a 5 percent return on the share capital at a fixed exchange rate for the entire duration of the 99-year contract. Such guarantee payments were treated as debt. When annual net earnings exceeded 5 percent, the company had to repay any past guarantee payments by transferring half of their surplus profits over 5 percent to the GOI. After past guarantee payments were paid off, the company received the entire surplus profits.
Apart from guarantees, the companies could return the railways to the GOI with a six-month notice, while the GOI could buy the railways on the 25 th or 50 th anniversary of their original contract. If the GOI chose to buy the railways, they paid the shareholders the average market value of the shares trading in London over the past three years. Under the contracts, companies could also float debentures (i.e., bonds) to finance further extensions. Some but not all the debentures could be converted into shares. With contracts in hand, these guaranteed companies, as they came to be known, floated multiple securities on the London Stock Exchange. A majority of the capital was raised through shares backed with the dividend guarantee. Many early railway companies did not earn five percent and the GOI paid the difference using Indian tax revenues. On account of their less than stellar performance, the GOI began to take over these guaranteed companies as their contracts came due in the late nineteenth century. Other than three companies taken over on their 50 th anniversary, the rest were taken over on their 25 th anniversary. 6 In five cases the GOI signed new contracts with directors of the former companies to operate their railways after takeovers. Here, the GOI purchased three-quarters to four-fifths of the shares of the original company. On purchase, the former share-holders were paid in the form of annuities that also traded on the London Stock Exchange. 7 A reconstituted company controlled the minority of shares ranging from a quarter to a fifth and managed operations under a 25-year contract. The reconstituted company split the profits with the GOI in proportion to their capital share.
These reconstituted companies also floated securities in London.
In the case of three guaranteed companies, the GOI took over ownership and operation at purchase. 8 These lines were operated alongside other GOI owned lines that were constructed in the 1870s as official opinion soured away from private British companies.
However, the experiment with complete state owned and operated railways was shortlived. In the 1880s, a new public-private railway entity emerged. Such projects involved the GOI owning a majority of the capital with a private British company owning the rest. The company managed railway operations and split the profits with the GOI again in proportion to their capital share. These companies also raised capital in London using equity. Unlike the original guaranteed companies, they were backed by lower guarantees for shorter periods of time. The public-private partnership model was common up to the 1920s when the GOI began taking over the operating companies leading to the eventual takeover of all railway operations. The changes during the 1920s reflect a new policy regime where Indians had greater control over railways. We focus on financial returns to railways in the period where British control was at its peak.
Data
Our data come from the Investors Monthly Manual (IMM) as digitized by the International Center for Finance (ICF) at the Yale School of Management. We use their database and reference the hard copies when necessary. IMM has the monthly universe of securities that traded on the London Stock Exchange from 1869 to 1929. They include the monthly 6 Three companies, Great Indian Peninsula, Bombay, Baroda and Central India, and Madras were taken over on their 50 th anniversary because they renegotiated their contracts in 1869. As part of the deal the Secretary cleared company debts and voided the Government's right to repurchase at the 25 th year of the contract. In return companies had to share half of all surplus net profits (i.e., above the guarantee) with the GOI from that point forward. 7 The two exceptions were Bombay, Baroda and Central India, and Oudh and Rohilkhand where no annuities were floated after takeover. In this case, the shareholders were paid off at takeover. 8 After takeovers the Government chose to operate Eastern Bengal, Sind, Punjab and Delhi, and Oudh and Rohilkhand railways.
opening price, high, low and end price of each security. They also report dividends and capital information.
The database contains all the published IMM series. They also added new variables such as country code and security type. But, ICF does not share the instructions given to the coders, which makes it hard to interpret some series. We describe these issues in detail below. We first use the country code to select securities from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Colonial Indian railways cross the borders of these three countries. We exclude Burma because it was a separate colony from 1937 up to its independence in 1948. We focus on railways using the industry code for railways.
9 Indian railway companies were often British companies operating in India. Our understanding is ICF uses the primary place of business to code the country. ICF also codes the type of security as follows: (1) government bond, (2) common equity, (3) corporate bond, and (4) preferred stock. ICF does not explain how they code security types. Based on our analysis of Indian security names and Grossman (2015, 2017), we believe they used the following rules. A corporate bond is any security with an interest rate or the word "debenture" in their name. 10 A preferred stock is any security with the word "preferred" in their name. The remaining securities are common equity.
As described in Section 2, guaranteed railway companies floated shares backed by a GOI dividend guarantee. ICF codes three guaranteed securities as common stock. But, the remaining securities are coded as bonds. In the IMM hard copies, these securities are listed as company name followed by "guaranteed 5 percent by Indian Gov".
We create a new coding for Indian railway securities. First, we code the guaranteed securities of the original railway companies. 11 Second, we code any security with the word "debenture" or "bond" as a corporate bond. Third, we code the remaining securities as equity including the preferred shares. None of the railway companies operating in India were floating pure ordinary shares. Most received guaranteed interest for at least a few years. But, their terms were less generous than those of the original guaranteed securities. Hence, we bin them with preferred shares. The label equity separates them from guaranteed securities and corporate bonds.
We use the clean data to construct the market capitalization of railway securities. 9 We follow ICF's coding here based on the IMM hard copies. But, we made one change. The "Assam Railways and Trading Com." is not recorded as a railway company in IMM. Assam railways started as a railways company before diversifying into trade. We believe it should be counted as a railway company. And, we record it as such.
10 That said, one security with the word 'debenture' is recorded as a preferred stock in the ICF data. 11 After the GOI bought the original guaranteed companies, the GOI paid some of their shareholders using annuities that traded on the Exchange. We are unable to calculate their market capitalization because their series are non-standard from other securities. Hence, we exclude annuities from the analysis. We have calculated simple capital gains for annuities. They average less than 0.1% per year. Their prices did not change much.
Although IMM reports the monthly open, end and high price, we use the end of January price. If it is missing, we use the monthly open price. We observe some large price swings because of stock splits. Previous studies, like Grossman (2015) , have omitted stock splits when calculating capital gains. We do the same identifying stock splits using changes in the par value of a security. Since par value is missing for some securities, we also drop securities if their price ever changes by more than three times over the previous January.
Such large swings are stock splits or data entry errors.
Market capitalization of a security is the number of shares multiplied by their market price. To calculate market capitalization, we use the series on capital subscribed and capital amount per share. 12 The number of shares is capital subscribed divided by the capital amount per share. But, in many cases the capital subscribed is reported as market capitalization of the security at par, often 100 for Indian railways. Such securities are identified as "stock" in the capital amount per share series, or in their name. 13 In this case, we calculate the number of shares as capital subscribed divided by 100. For example, Bengal Nagpur had a fully subscribed capital of 3,000,000 in January 1913. The closing price was 114, which implied it traded at 14% above par. Therefore its market capitalization was 1.14*3,000,000=3,420,000.
IMM changed the reporting of dividends in this period. While in later decades they report the dividend along with the date it was paid, in the 1860s they publish the last four dividends paid (for example, "4 6 7 5") followed by the months in which they were paid (for example, "Jan, July"). Unfortunately, the IMM gives no explanation of whether the first number in the string of reported numbers is the most recent dividend. We inspected the dividend series for some securities in the months before and after a dividend was announced. In some cases, the first number is the most recent dividend paid by the company, but in other cases the fourth number appears to be the most recent dividend.
On account of these ambiguities, we use the series "last two dividends at latest price per cent". This series is reported from 1879 to 1929. So we report dividend yields for this period, and capital gains for the entire 1869-1929 period. Figure 1 shows the total number of Indian securities trading on the London Stock
Exchange from 1869 to 1929. The y-axis to the left shows the number of issues, while the y-axis to the right shows the percentage of rail issues to total issues and the percentage of rail non-equity issues to total non-equity issues. Total number of Indian securities increased from 65 in 1869 to 120 in 1929. While railways dominated Indian issues early, accounting for 80% of issues in 1869, they declined to just under 40% by 1929.
12 Unlike other industries, capital subscribed is always reported in pounds for Indian railways. See Grossman (2017) for issues surrounding the construction of market capitalization in the IMM. 13 Before 1889, stocks were identified with a missing capital amount per share.
Most early issues were the guaranteed securities and railway corporate bonds. These two groups accounted for 54 issues in 1869. But, the picture began to change in the 1890s.
More equity financed, non-rail companies raised money in London. Within railways, however, there was a small shift away from bonds and guaranteed securities. Non-equity rail issues as a percentage of total non-equity issues decreased from close to 100% in 1869 to around 70% in 1929.
Total issues mask the large market capitalization of railways. 
Returns to Indian Railway Securities
We construct the total returns to any security as the sum of capital gains and dividend yield. In any year, t, the capital gain is the increase in the value of the security in January compared to the previous January as shown below:
Here, P t is the price of the security in year, t. Dividend yield is normally calculated as D t /P t−1 where D t is the annual dividend paid to shareholders. In our returns estimate, we use the reported dividend yield series that begins in 1879. As a result, we construct capital gain indices from 1869 to 1929, but total returns from 1879 to 1929. Some railway securities exit the data. In the baseline, we assume that investors were paid the market value on the last January the security was traded before exiting. This assumption is necessary because we do not generally know on what terms a security exits. As a robustness check, we assess this assumption of exit gains or losses using the guaranteed railways as a case study. Figure 3a shows the unweighted and market capitalization weighted capital gain indices for bonds and guaranteed securities. The weighted series is like the unweighted series. Returns to big and small companies were similar.
14 Several important patterns stand out. First, the capital gains to Indian railways were positive in the 1870s and 1880s.
It appears there was growing confidence these securities would yield higher returns in the future. Second, the capital gains to holding guaranteed securities were higher than bonds up to the late 1890s. Investors seem to have perceived a larger upside to guaranteed railways. Third, the capital gains on guaranteed railways turned negative after 1899 reducing the index of capital appreciation. In 1899 there were 3 remaining guaranteed railway companies. Their share price saw significant declines over the next few years before they were taken over. Apparently, investors were more pessimistic about guaranteed railways potential after 1900. The pessimism was less significant for railway bonds as that index fell less in the early 1900s. Fourth, World War I was associated with a decline in the capital value of Indian railways followed by a partial recovery in the 1920s.
As mentioned above, we do not incorporate the exit terms of securities because of data limitations. However, in the case of the eight guaranteed companies we can check the implications of this assumption. Using several sources we identified the final purchase price for the eight guaranteed railways. 15 We use the final price to calculate a 'final capital' gain or loss at GOI purchase. The final capital gain equals (P F inal − P t )/P t , where P F inal is the purchase price and P t is our last recorded share price. According to these calculations, the final capital gain was significant in only two cases. The Great Indian Peninsula railway and the Madras railways purchased in 1900 and 1907 had a final capital gain equal to 16.9% and 14.5% respectively. All other railways had a final capital gain less than 2%. Based on these results, there is no significant error from ignoring how securities exit.
In figure 3b , we show the dividend yields for the guaranteed securities and bonds from 1879. Again, weighting does not change the picture. Dividends were very stable averaging around 4% up to 1913. World War 1 contributed to the increase in the 1910s.
The higher yields reflected lower share prices, not higher dividends. The dividend yields 14 In the numbers below, we use the unweighted returns. Figure 3c compares capital gains and dividend yields for common equity to the nonequity securities. We do not observe any railway equities in the 1870s. Hence, we only show capital gains for equities, not capital gain indices. Railway equities experienced bigger highs and lows than bonds. Equities also paid higher dividends than bonds averaging 5.4% from 1892 to 1929. Bonds averaged 4.5% for the same period.
Tables 2a-c summarizes the total returns on all types of railway securities. The average total return on guaranteed securities, bonds, and equities was 3.7%, 4.6%, and 7%
respectively. Of special interest is the finding that guaranteed railways had the lowest return and earned less than 5%. These securities traded above par and therefore 5% dividends on the face value were discounted.
Tables 2a-c also report the standard deviation and the Sharpe Ratio for guarantee securities, bonds, and equities. The ratio equals the average return minus the risk free rate divided by the standard deviation, which captures returns per unit of risk for a given portfolio. We use the interest rate on UK government debt from 1869 to 1929 (3.11%) as the risk free rate. We believe it provides a good comparison for Indian railway securities traded in London. The Sharpe ratios are low for Indian railway securities from 1880 to 1929. The most attractive was bonds because it offered moderate returns with moderate variation. Overall the returns on investing in Indian railway securities were respectable, not large. There is little evidence to support the view that railway were a vehicle for financial extraction in India.
Returns to Global Railway Securities
We now compare the financial performance of Indian railways to railways around the world. An important caveat is in order first. Even though the IMM data provide an important snapshot of foreign railway securities, we cannot speak to railways financed on other exchanges. This is more likely to bias the comparison to Europe and North America, compared to other regions. Most Asian, African, and Latin American railways were financed in London, the global financial center. We exclude all non-rail IMM securities using the industry classification of securities.
We also exclude securities trading in currencies other than the British pound. Almost 20 percent of security-year observations are traded in US dollars and fewer than 1 percent in Canadian dollars. We then bin securities into seven regions: Africa, Asia (excluding India), Australia (including New Zealand), Europe, Latin America, North America and Great Britain. 16 Using Yale's coding of security type, we group securities as corporate bonds and common stock or preferred shares. We bin common stock with preferred shares to match the coding of Indian securities. In the Indian case, ordinary shares of railway companies often enjoyed temporary guarantees. These and other privileges suggest common stock was like preferred shares. We drop securities with stock splits and code prices in the same manner as described in Section 3 for Indian railways. Australia trade fewer than ten issues on average in this period. Asia averages 10 issues. While Africa had few railways, Asia and Australia had many state owned railways. Table 3 shows the proportion of non-equity issues by region. India's reliance on debt financing was not unique. Non-equities account for 85% of issues in India. Here, the non-equities are corporate bonds and the guaranteed securities. Africa and Asia also use debt with non-equities averaging 85% and 75% of issues. Other than Britain, non-equities account for majority of the issues trading in London. Hence, we first focus on returns to non-equities i.e., corporate bonds, in the global comparison below. Figure 5 shows six graphs of unweighted capital appreciation indices by region with the exception of Africa and Australia because they have few bonds trading in the early years. In the first graph, we show Indian guaranteed securities as a dash line and bonds as a solid line. In the next graphs, we compare India in black to each region in gray noted in the sub-title. As seen in the first row, capital appreciation for Indian bonds and guaranteed securities trailed Asia and Latin America. Indeed, the capital appreciation for Latin American bonds was three times as high as Indian. Capital appreciation in Europe and North America was also higher than in India, at least up to World War I. With respect to Britain, Indian railway capital appreciation was strikingly similar. 16 We drop two companies from the British island colonies of Barbados and Jamaica (0.05 percent of security-year observations). They do not fit the standard regional bins and are not a meaningful comparison to colonial India on their own. 17 We focus on end of January prices. To identify stock splits, we use information on par value of the stock. And, we drop securities that experience a change in their par value. Since par value is missing for many securities, we also drop any security where the price in any year is three times higher than the previous January. This rule captures stock splits and data entry errors. Such high price changes are rare and lie about the 99th percentile of the capital gain distribution of the world and India.
Britain's railways were considered low risk-low return by investors. Apparently investors saw Indian railways the same way.
Dividend yields to corporate bonds show similar patterns in Figure 6 . Indian bond yields averaged 4.4% from 1879 to 1929. They trailed Asia (5.8%), Latin America (6%), North America (5.1%), and Europe (5%). Britain was the only country with lower yields at 4.1%. We have a complete series on dividend yields for African and Australian yields only from 1889 to 1929. In this period, Indian bond yields averaged 4.4% compared to 6% for Africa and 5% for Australia. Again, Indian yields were not excessive.
Looking at the guaranteed securities does not change the picture. As noted before, the last of the original guaranteed companies was taken over in 1908. So we summarize the comparative patterns for 1879-1908. Dividend yields to Indian guaranteed securities average 3.8% compared to 5.2% for Asia and 5.7% for Latin America. Indian yields again trail those in Europe (4.3%) and North America (4.9%). Across the board, Indian yields and capital returns to non-equities tracked Britain.
In the final comparison, we show capital gains and dividend yields for common equity (ordinary and preferred shares). We do not plot Indian capital gains before 1890 because few Indian equities were trading in the early years. Indeed, there were no Indian railway equities in the 1870s. Like India, Africa and Australia also had many years with no equities in London. Figure 7 shows capital gains in comparative graphs and Figure 8 shows dividend yields. India is shown in black with the other regions in gray. Indian equities were less volatile than North American or Latin American equities. If anything, their ups and downs tracked British equities. Average dividend yields at 5.1% were lower than Latin America (6.2%) and North America (5.3%). They were comparable to Europe (5%) and higher than Britain (4.4%). Table 4 summarizes the patterns on bonds and reports the Sharpe ratio for different regions of the world. Indian railway bonds and guaranteed securities did not enjoy exceptional performance. They had lower returns per unit of risk than Asian, Latin American and even North American securities. Indian railway securities tracked British securities offering similar or slightly higher returns. British investors had many choices. Indian railways were one among the many profitable securities trading in London, but they were by no means the most lucrative. Again, there is little evidence to support the idea that railways were a vehicle for financial extraction in India.
Event Study
In this section we provide further evidence challenging claims that guarantees significantly benefited British investors. As discussed above, all guaranteed railways were partially or completely nationalized between 1879 and 1908. Investors were paid the average stock price in the 3 years prior to the takeover date. One might expect high investor returns leading up to takeover if institutions were generally extractive. One might also imagine a 'gaming' of stock prices to increase the GOI purchase price. We use an event study to test for abnormal returns in the three years leading to takeover of the original guaranteed companies.
Event studies are used to test how investors respond to different types of firm-specific or macro events. Most event studies involve the following steps.
18 First, is the choice of event(s) under study, which leads to a definition of the event window. Studies using modern capital market data define event windows as few days before the event, the event is defined as t = 0, and then few days after. Defining an event window as ten days before and after events is common practice. Second, is the selection of firms to study. Third, involves predicting the counterfactual return as if the event had not occurred, i.e., normal return. Fourth, is estimating the abnormal return, which is the difference between the actual and the predicted return. And, fifth is testing whether the abnormal return is significantly different from zero.
In addition to estimating individual firm specific abnormal returns, the methodology allows for estimating Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) for example, across firms experiencing the same event, Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), which involves adding the abnormal returns for each day within the event window or a subset thereof, and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR), which involves averaging the CAR across firms.
In our case, we do not have daily data on stock prices. Rather, we adapt the eventstudy methodology to our monthly returns. In particular, we define the event as the GOI takeover and the event window as the three year window before takeover. Here, the sample only includes companies that were taken over.
One common approach to estimating the normal return uses the market model in some defined estimation window, typically 120 to 210 days before the event. We define the estimation window as the three year window (36 months) up to four years before takeover. For example, the Great Indian Peninsula Company was taken over in June 1900. Its event window extends from July 1897 to June 1900, while the estimation window runs from July 1893 to June 1896. We drop the year immediately before the three-year window because it could be contaminated by discussions of takeover.
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In a standard market model, the individual return of a firm is regressed on a market 19 That said, our results are essentially the same if we use shorter or longer estimation windows.
return in the estimation window. But, the choice of market return is unclear in our context. Although these guaranteed securities traded in London, they appear to be uncorrelated with a British domestic equity index. And, as seen in the last section, markets treated these securities as bonds, not equity. To get around this problem, we use the Comparison Period Mean adjusted model. Here, the abnormal return is defined as:
whereR i is the mean return of the security in the estimation window. Using the individual abnormal return, we construct the cumulative return for each firm as follows:
Here, we define t 1 and t 2 as the beginning and end dates of our event window. We also present CAR results for windows 1 year, 6 months and 3 months leading to takeover.
And, the cumulative average abnormal return for GOI takeovers as the average of the cumulative abnormal returns across all firms. To summarize, the GOI paid the shareholders the average share price in the three year window leading to takeover. Some payments were made in the form of annuities, others were paid outright. While the institutional context suggests British shareholders might have earned positive returns as a result, we find no evidence of systematic positive abnormal returns. Even if shareholders could figure out how to collude, it would seem gaming did not occur.
Conclusion
Using detailed annual data on Indian securities trading in London over the late 19 th and early 20 th century, we study the financial returns to investing in Indian railways compared to railways in other parts of the world. There are several main conclusions. First, Indian securities offered modest financial returns to investors. Guaranteed railways and railway bonds were the largest in market value and their annual total returns equaled 3.7% and 4.6% on average. Second, Indian securities had lower returns per unit of risk compared to railway securities in other parts of the world. Indian railways were low risk-low return, even though India was one of the least developed economies with securities on the London Stock Exchange. Third, there is no evidence that colonial railway policy led to extraction via investor returns. Our study raises questions about whether colonial institutions in India resulted in extraction in the private sector. That is not to say that colonialism was benign. Instead, we believe scholars need to look at individual sectors of the economy to assess the nature and effects of policies on the economy. Only then can we begin to draw any general conclusion on the nature of institutions in India.
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Figure A1: Railway Map of India, 1909 Notes: East Indian is excluded in the CAAR calculation because we entered their data and constructed their dividend yield from the published IMM series. For the other railways we used the dividend yield series as reported in the IMM after 1879. We did not want to pool these data for the CAAR if the published dividend yield series is constructed differently from our construction.
